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Abstract 1 
 2 
The present article contemplates the future of reflective practice in the domain of applied 3 
sport psychology and, in so doing, seeks to engender further critical debate and comment. 4 
More specifically, the discussion to follow re-visits the topic of ‘reflective-levels’ and builds 5 
a case for ‘critical reflection’ as an aspiration for those engaged in pedagogy or applied sport 6 
psychology training regimens. Assumptions and commentators associated with critical social 7 
science (e.g., Habermas, 1974; Carr & Kemmis, 1986), action research (e.g., Carr & Kemmis, 8 
1986; Leitch & Day, 2000), and critical reflection (e.g., Morgan, 2007) suggest a number of 9 
foundation points from which critical reflection might be better understood. Finally, writing 10 
about ones- self via the processes of critical reflection and through reflective practice more 11 
generally are briefly considered in cautionary terms (Bleakley, 2000; du Preez, 2008).  Auto-12 
ethnography in sport (Gilbourne, 2002; Stone, 2009) is finally proposed as one potential 13 
source of illustration and inspiration for reflective practitioners in terms of both content and 14 
style.  15 
 16 
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      Aspiration, inspiration and illustration: Initiating debate on reflective practice writing 26 
A growing body of literature has provided insights into the processes and outcomes 27 
that might be associated with reflective practice. For example, Holt and Strean (2001) 28 
illustrated the reflections of a neophyte practitioner, and since then several other papers from 29 
early career practitioners have emerged (e.g., Cropley, Miles, Hanton, & Niven, 2007; Jones, 30 
Evans, & Mullen, 2007; Knowles, Gilbourne, Tomlinson, & Anderson, 2007; Lindsay, 31 
Breckon, Thomas, & Maynard, 2006; Woodcock, Richards, & Mugford, 2008). In contrast to 32 
those offerings by early career practitioners, The British Psychological Society (BPS) Sport 33 
and Exercise Psychology Review Special Issue (2006) collated seven reflective accounts 34 
from experienced practitioners who had provided sport psychology support at the Olympic 35 
Games in Athens. In addition to the above accounts of reflective practice Anderson, Knowles 36 
and Gilbourne (2004) have made a more generic case for reflective practice being deployed 37 
to support applied training within sport psychology.  Collectively, the literature from the 38 
sport domain has helped to promote a more thorough understanding of what reflective 39 
practice is (and indeed isn’t).   40 
There is evidence to suggest that reflective practice is being increasingly recognized 41 
as an important process within the broader canvas of applied sport psychology. In the UK for 42 
example, the British Association of Sport and Exercise Science (BASES) supervised 43 
experience program (2004-2009) required supervisees to engage in critical reading of key 44 
journal sources and to use this material to stimulate their own engagement in and evidence of 45 
this process. The 2009 programme has now located reflection as a key skill within one of ten 46 
competencies, offers direct training and guidance on techniques and states that competency in 47 
reflective practice must be achieved (http://www.bases.org.uk/Supervised-Experience). 48 
Within the BPS guidelines for Stage Two training there is an expectation that reflective 49 
practice will take place and be evidenced through a reflective log or diary. Furthermore, 50 
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transfer from the (BASES) accredited status to BPS Chartership is subject to candidates 51 
providing a portfolio containing (amongst other requirements) “substantial evidence of 52 
reflective practice” (http://www.bps.org.uk/careers/society_qual/spex/downloads.cfm).  53 
These developments indicate that reflective practice is becoming a common process 54 
within UK-based sport psychology training. This together with the recent accounts of 55 
reflective practice being used internationally in sport psychology training and practice (e.g., 56 
Holt & Strean, 2001; Tod, 2007; Van Raalte & Andersen, 2000), underscores the importance 57 
of sustaining a critical dialogue on themes and processes that might influence the direction 58 
and efficacy of reflective practice more generally. The present article is, in part, based on the 59 
above view and considers the future of reflective practice in both supportive and critical 60 
terms.  61 
Challenges for those engaged in reflection. 62 
As reflective practice becomes increasingly embedded with applied training it is 63 
likely that the writing of reflective experiences for applied training and applied/research-64 
based peer review publications of reflective accounts will become more widespread. Recently 65 
completed doctoral research (Knowles, 2009) suggested that when reflective practice is 66 
associated with a professional training program then program directors may feel a need seek 67 
out means through which to integrate reflective practice into the associated professional 68 
development curricula (e.g., B.Sc/M.Sc Sport Psychology programs accredited by the BPS). 69 
Alongside these pragmatic/pedagogic considerations Knowles (2009) also suggested that 70 
educators, supervisors/mentors and reflective practitioners continue to explore, possibly in a 71 
more philosophical sense, what the reflective process might be trying to achieve and what it 72 
might become. In general terms, it is possible to speculate these reflect a few of the 73 
challenges for those practitioners and educators/mentors who will expect to utilize or evaluate 74 
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reflective practice. It seems timely then to consider how reflection and the writing of 75 
reflective accounts might develop and mature in the years ahead.  76 
Challenges that emerge from asking such a wide ranging questions do, at some point, 77 
relate to the “end-product” of reflection both in terms of how reflection impacts upon 78 
personal awareness and also how such awareness might be conveyed via the style and content 79 
of reflective writing. The way reflective experiences are presented in text impacts upon both 80 
pedagogy-related assessments and on reflective writing that emerges from applied training. In 81 
an attempt to stimulate debate on this issue the present article seeks to critically explore the 82 
issue of reflective levels and consider, more specifically, how critical reflection might be 83 
first, understood and secondly, conveyed in writing. In undertaking this task the present paper 84 
seeks to propose ideas for those who might presently, or in the future, write and/or evaluate 85 
reflective texts.  86 
Writing reflectively: Revisiting reflective levels. 87 
At this moment in time the dominant method of representation for reflection appears 88 
to be via a written account presented at intervals within, or at the conclusion of, a period of 89 
training. Given that reflective practice, reflective writing and the evaluation of both is a 90 
relatively new experience for many of those who practice within the sport and exercise 91 
sciences the process might be seen as one that is evolving. At such an embryonic moment it 92 
seems reasonable to ponder questions such as “What should be reflected on?” and “How 93 
reflective-experience might be written down?” These and other questions are considered here 94 
by placing an emphasis on the demonstration of different reflective levels.  The notion of 95 
‘reflective level’ in the sport domain was first discussed by Knowles, Gilbourne, Borrie, and 96 
Nevill (2001). At that time, it was proposed as a means by which both writer and reviewer 97 
might locate and plot development from a lower (pragmatic and localized practice-based 98 
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reflection), through a phase that demonstrated emotional engagement and towards a 99 
higher/critical level of reflection.  100 
One troublesome by-product that emerges from the promotion of a reflective 101 
hierarchy (or any hierarchy for that matter) is that lower levels in the hierarchy might be 102 
devalued when contrasted with higher elements. Texts that seek to demonstrate critical 103 
reflection are quite common, particularly across the Action Research literature (e.g., Morley, 104 
2007) and this desire to demonstrate critical engagement suggests that a certain value has 105 
been placed on such an attainment. Awareness of such tendencies led Knowles (2009) to 106 
caution readers against the perception of reflection that is technical  (linked typically with 107 
issues of efficiency, effectiveness and accountability), and reflection that is practical in 108 
nature (associated with the exploration of personal meaning) being viewed as (somehow) less 109 
valuable or less ‘mature’ than reflection which demonstrates critical engagement (see 110 
Anderson et al., 2004 for further detail on these terms).  111 
In the present text the idea that one form of reflection might always be viewed as 112 
superior to another is seen as a difficult proposition to sustain. For example, it would appear 113 
logical for technical or critical observation to be viewed as both reasonable and/or 114 
inappropriate depending on the context in which the reflection takes place. In other words it 115 
seems fair to suggest that different scenarios are better suited to different types of reflection. 116 
Two illustrations are used here to clarify this line of thinking. First, if a particular sport 117 
psychology intervention consistently generates a lack of positive response from the client 118 
then the practitioner might benefit from a period of technical and/or practical reflection, 119 
“what is it about this intervention that isn’t working?” or “why does the client seem so 120 
reluctant to work with me?” A different example might find a sport psychologist sensing a 121 
longitudinal and ill-defined dissatisfaction with their own practice. In this more opaque case 122 
reflection across all three levels of interest might be useful but critical reflection might be 123 
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particularly valuable in assisting the psychologist to view their work in a more expansive, 124 
profound and insightful manner.  125 
It has already been noted that the demonstration of critical reflection need not 126 
necessarily be a prerequisite for peer review dissemination. The contemporary reflective 127 
literature houses a number of manuscripts that are based primarily upon technical and 128 
practical reflections and these are both informative and interesting. We make this observation 129 
to stress the utility of technical and practical reflection and to ensure that the arguments that 130 
follow do not make readers feel that we somehow downgrade this form of reflection or 131 
writing. 132 
The above points aside, the remainder of the paper does focus (almost exclusively) on 133 
the issue of critical reflection and a number of rationale are offered to support this emphasis. 134 
First of all critical reflection is not widely evidenced in the reflective sports literature (see 135 
Knowles et al., 2007). Secondly, the challenges associated with critical reflection might be 136 
unclear to many. Finally, and by tackling certain issues associated with points one and two, 137 
there would appear to be a need to identify and offer illustrations from a literature source that 138 
engages with critical thinking and can provide evidence of how this genre might appear to the 139 
reader. Consequently auto-ethnography is presented here as one potential source of critical 140 
writing that demonstrates different forms of author-engaged writing-style. To further support 141 
these three observations an overview of the role of critical reflection within reflective practice 142 
(critical reflective practice) would appear timely and the next few lines attempt to sketch out 143 
a foundation point from which the present paper can progress.  144 
It is clear that the demonstration of critical reflection is not an expectation within 145 
undergraduate curricular or a factor in the early phases of applied training for that matter (as 146 
perhaps seen with Woodcock et al., 2008). It has also been established that critical reflection 147 
does not act as criteria for publication. Those observations aside, the case for critical 148 
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reflection being demonstrated towards the concluding stages of postgraduate 149 
education/applied instruction (i.e. BPS Stage Two in the UK) is a more compelling 150 
proposition and we return to this point in the concluding section. To extend participation in 151 
critical reflective practice beyond the realm of professional training is it positioned here as a 152 
means by which experienced practitioners can also develop and document effective practice 153 
with clients. The discussion to follow is based on a perceived need to explore both the 154 
possibilities and the difficulties associated with critical reflective practice. The text to follow 155 
seeks first of all to clarify what critical reflection might include and secondly considers where 156 
those interested in or engaged with reflective practitioners/practice might look for further 157 
guidance, illustration and inspiration.      158 
 Critical reflective practice: Establishing what it might mean. 159 
One way of beginning a conversation on critical reflective practice is to consider 160 
critical reflection first of all.  Being critical in the sense of noting, “that practice did not work, 161 
I need to work out why and change it” or, “I am overly involved emotionally with this team 162 
and need to step back”, is of course very useful but these two statements indicate critique 163 
(rather than critical reflection) and moreover suggest that technical and practical reflection 164 
can harbor such observations. This notion of critique can be associated with critical thinking 165 
as espoused by Ziegler (1995). These examples, however, are not at all related to critical 166 
reflection (as outlined in the discussion to follow) as this we associated primarily with the 167 
notion of critical social science. Knowles et al. (2001) described critical reflection as follows: 168 
At this level, issues of justice and emancipation enter deliberations over the value of 169 
professional goals and practice. The practitioner makes links between the setting of 170 
everyday practice and broader social structure and forces and may contribute to 171 
ethical decision making in practice. (p. 192) 172 
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In making the above point we are wary that notions of “justice” and “emancipation” 173 
may seem rather esoteric even fanciful, however, in professional practice matters of justice 174 
(such as fairness and equity) and emancipation (a sense of being set free from constraining 175 
influences) are central to ethical practice that seeks to help and avoid coercion. In that regard, 176 
the above terms may, at first glance, spear some distance away from the day-to-day grind of 177 
everyday work, yet, and in our view, are central to it. In the discussion to follow themes of 178 
justice and emancipation will appear several times, will also be related to different literature 179 
sources and be constantly related to the notion of critical social science. 180 
Locating critical debate within action research literature 181 
The action research literature houses a philosophy and nomenclature dominated by 182 
references to ‘critical’ engagement. Commenting on typologies that have been used to guide 183 
action-research, Gilbourne (1999) suggested that evidence for critical engagement related to 184 
an awareness and examination of self in juxtaposition to wider contextual matters such as 185 
institutional power, a view that also embraced the possibilities afforded by personal 186 
empowerment and emancipation of self and/or others. Similarly, Leitch and Day (2000) in a 187 
paper that sought to integrate reflective practice and action research argued that teachers’ 188 
who undertake action research in the classroom, often neglect or give insufficient attention to 189 
the nature of the reflective process. Their case hinted towards a critical agenda as they 190 
proposed that reflection is not a cursory experience but rather a multi-faceted and potentially 191 
empowering process, sentiments that have been echoed by a number of commentators over 192 
the years. For example, Schön (1983) emphasized the complexity of the reflective process by 193 
differentiating between reflection-on and reflection-in-action. He argued that reflection-on-194 
action was a process of systematic and thoughtful analysis that drew knowledge from 195 
experience. In contrast reflection-in-action was related to the thinking that takes place ‘in-196 
vivo’ (thinking on one’s feet!).  197 
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The above notions of reflection being a truly cognitive exercise, one that embraces 198 
self and the plight of others, appears common to critical themes that are present in the 199 
writings of Dewey (1933) and Carr and Kemmis (1986). A glance across the action research 200 
literature (particularly in the domains of education and health) suggests that the thinking of 201 
Carr and Kemmis (1986) serves as a common philosophical foundation from which a number 202 
of reflective epistemologies have emerged. Through reference to the earlier work of 203 
Habermas (1972/ 1974), Carr and Kemmis argued for different levels of human ‘interest’ 204 
being linked to types of knowledge which were in turn attached to different paradigms of 205 
science. In discussing the thinking of Carr and Kemmis (1986), Gilbourne (1999) stressed the 206 
alignment between technical, practical, or emancipatory interests and empiricist, interpretive 207 
and critical sciences respectively. To Carr and Kemmis the importance of embracing what 208 
they termed ‘critical social science’ was essential in order to renew and reassess the 209 
relationship between theory and practice and their views are central to the overall case that 210 
we seek to make in the present paper. In explaining their rationale they point to the 211 
emergence in the 1970’s of modern science and argued that one consequence of this was that 212 
“rationality was now exhaustively defined in terms of conformity to the rules of scientific 213 
thinking, and, as such, (was) deprived of all creative, critical and evaluative powers” (p. 133). 214 
The above sentiments resonate with elements of Schön’s (1983/ 1987) critique depicting 215 
science as the basis for technical rationality, a way of explaining how the world works in 216 
clean and precise terms. Schön saw the world in more contextual terms and described the 217 
workplace through the imagery of a ‘swamp’, life in the swamp being anything but tidy. Such 218 
thinking was related to the need to listen and so come to understand how people viewed their 219 
swamp and how they had managed to survive within it. 220 
Understanding and encouraging others to engage with the multi-layered challenges 221 
that are to be found in any social situation appears central to the thinking of Carr and Kemmis 222 
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(1986) also. As they develop their thesis for a critical social science approach to theory and 223 
practice and by referring extensively to the work of Habermas (1972/1974) they emphasize 224 
that they, like Habermas, are not against science per se but rather seek to promote a form of 225 
social science that moves past uncritical renderings and accounts that offer illuminations. 226 
Therefore they propose a move towards engagement that effectively challenges what might 227 
be viewed as established and so (potentially) uncover distortions and inequalities. In so doing 228 
they acknowledge, through what Habermas terms “the ideal speech situation”, that thinking 229 
creatively and with the true interests of others at heart, cannot be undertaken if compulsion or 230 
coercion (by powerful others, such as mentors) only allows a particular view to flourish. 231 
Whilst it is widely accepted that freedom of speech is part and parcel of science, our 232 
emphasis on coercion speaks to a more subtle form of control one that inhabits hierarchy and 233 
systems (such as accreditation) whereby participants adhere to “the rules” in the same way 234 
that their mentors had done before the. In that sense coercion is more covert than overt, more 235 
institutional than personal.  236 
Carr and Kemmis (1986) explain a distinction between critical theory and critical 237 
social science. The former emerges from a process of critique and so, in the case of modern 238 
day sport psychology, might be a perspective that has grown from interpretive qualitative 239 
inquiry (mental toughness might be a good recent example). These critical theories often 240 
inform practice and again, within the domain of sport psychology, applied practice 241 
interventions are informed by a range of macro theoretical positions (i.e., self-efficacy and 242 
achievement goal-theory) and these offer good exemplars of critical theory. However, within 243 
critical social science the aim is to enlighten practice by considering and challenging the 244 
efficacy of theory and to query the processes that organize knowledge and deliver action. 245 
These aspirations are thought to be attained through personal and shared reflection (in the 246 
case of sport psychology that might be with groups such as coaches, athletes and so forth). 247 
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From such actions and from such points of challenge, theory can be deconstructed and 248 
reconstructed but, and to repeat and earlier point, the climate that allows such engagement is 249 
one without coercion and with an open mind to one’s own risk of self deception (see Carr & 250 
Kemmis, 1986, pp.148-149). Self-deception might be associated with a reluctance to 251 
challenge. An uncritical acceptance of prior learning to the degree that it is seen 252 
unquestionably to represent some form of ‘truth’, a truth that is beyond chastisement, might 253 
be one example of this. 254 
The present discussion has already suggested that themes present in Carr and 255 
Kemmis’s (1986) depiction of critical social science appear in differential elements of the 256 
action-research literature and these often contain the signature of Habermasian thinking. Carr 257 
and Kemmis presented action research as a model of critical social science arguing that “in 258 
short, action research is a deliberate process for emancipating practitioners from the often 259 
unseen constraints of assumptions, habit precedent, coercion and ideology” (p. 192). 260 
The above sentiments resonate with later education-based texts that have explored 261 
critical engagement in one capacity or another. For example, in a text that calls for critical 262 
collaborative action research Aspland, Macpherson, Proudford and Whitmore (1996) argue 263 
that critical engagement requires “underlying assumptions and beliefs to be acknowledged 264 
(and for) curriculum trends and policies (to be) seen as problematic and contestable and for 265 
further action (to be) tied to critical frameworks which focus on social justice and 266 
empowerment for all” (p. 102). 267 
Similar aspirations are apparent in the action research literature and are often couched 268 
in the descriptors of protocol typologies that describe different categories of action research. 269 
In the domain of healthcare Hart and Bond (1995) proposed a category of action research that 270 
emphasized the aspiration to empower those who might be oppressed. In a similar manner, 271 
Holter and Schwartz-Barcott (1993) had earlier coined the term “professionalizing” research 272 
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which contained an assumption to enhance. Similarly Reason (1988) in his explanation of co-273 
operative inquiry (a close relative to action research) argued that “the notion of critical 274 
subjectivity means that we are more demanding than orthodox science, insisting that valid 275 
inquiry is based on a very high degree of self-knowing, self-reflection and co-operative 276 
criticism” (p. 13). These examples from the 1980’s and 1990’s suggest convergence around a 277 
typology of action research that contains references to the emancipatory-critical axis 278 
proposed by Carr and Kemmis (1986).  These texts, and texts that emerged later seem to 279 
coalesce around a view that critical engagement be it through reference to critical interest, 280 
critical social science (both discussed by Carr & Kemmis, 1986), or through various named 281 
typologies of action research, relate in some way to the individual reflecting on their and 282 
other’s role in the specific context of their day-to-day practice. These discussions also reflect 283 
on how this process engages with a wider contextual landscape that might include reference 284 
to institutional power and economic and/or political oppression.  285 
Depictions of critical reflection within the reflective practice literature 286 
When the process of critical reflection is considered more directly (as opposed to 287 
looking at reflection within a critical protocol such as action research) it is striking that many 288 
Habermasian themes outlined above, such as emancipation and the exploration of personal 289 
and shared distortion, re-surface but are expressed as being derivative of a different but 290 
associated literature-base. Morley (2007) offers an excellent and contemporary example of 291 
this tendency to share common critical aspirations whilst demonstrating divergence in 292 
relation to inspiration via literature, in discussing what critical reflection means to her she 293 
writes: 294 
It (that is critical reflection) draws attention not just to values that inform our practice, 295 
but also to the process of how we implement critical values in practice. Critical values 296 
in this sense are ‘primarily concerned with practicing in ways which further society 297 
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without domination, exploitation and oppression’ focusing ‘both on how structures 298 
dominate, but also on how people construct and are constructed by changing social 299 
structures and relations’ (Fook, 2002, p. 18). My understanding of critical reflection is 300 
therefore that it allows us to examine our own implicit, previously unexamined 301 
assumptions, which might limit or undermine our intended or espoused practice 302 
(Fook, 2002). This may include challenging our own self-interests and scrutinizing 303 
how our own social positioning and implicit beliefs, values and assumptions may be 304 
complicit with inequitable social arrangements. (pp. 62-63) 305 
Morley (2007) goes on to stress that critical thinking opens doors to new possibilities and so 306 
can have a liberating potential and again she cites Fook (2002) “This capacity for unsettling 307 
or destabilizing commonly held or accepted beliefs is potentially one of the most powerful 308 
sets of strategies that arise from…critical understanding” (p. 90). 309 
Morley (2007) also makes direct reference to the literature that has guided and underpinned 310 
her conception of reflective practice: 311 
The primary frameworks and perspectives I use to understand and inform critical 312 
reflection are critical theories such as feminism (Clift, 2005; Dominelli, 2002; Van 313 
Den Berh & Cooper, 1986), structural (Moreau, 1979), radical (Fook, 1983), and 314 
critical postmodernism (Fook, 1996, 2002).  315 
Within this collection of perspectives Morley (2007) argued that her analysis of language 316 
allowed her to understand how social ‘practices produce and construct meaning’, how 317 
universal narratives mirror modernist conceptions of power and how a constructivist 318 
approach to knowledge allows the possibility of an inductive generation of theory (a bottom-319 
up view/construction of knowledge).  320 
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 Other contributors to the reflective practice field approach their work through 321 
reference to Habermasian thinking, for example, O’Connor, Hyde and Treacy (2003) in their 322 
text on reflection in nurse teachers note that: 323 
…emancipatory knowledge developed through self-reflection has become a focus of 324 
interest to nurses in empowering them to throw off the shackles of their oppressed 325 
history (Harden, 1996). Such knowledge, pursued through the critical social sciences, 326 
has been heralded as part of the solution in addressing the restraining conditions 327 
evoked by domination, repression and ideological constraints in relation to thought 328 
and action (Habermas, 1971). (p. 108) 329 
 Their paper concludes with a view that striving for critical reflection would appear to 330 
be a positive aspirational goal but also note how challenging this aspiration actually is.  331 
Summarizing what critical reflection might be 332 
 This brief consideration of how critical reflection might be described and understood 333 
hopefully provides those associated with reflective practice in sport psychology with food for 334 
thought. From the examples we have presented it is clear that various literature sources might 335 
inform or guide policy makers, mentors and practitioners who are interested in the underlying 336 
reasoning that supports critical reflective practice. As authors we have found it interesting to 337 
note that differential literature sources provide the backdrop for similar end-points that 338 
emphasizes a sense of emancipation and encourages personal growth through an awareness 339 
and exploration of self that embraces a sense of morality and justice in practice and promotes 340 
the possibility of challenge and change.  341 
Such profound challenges suggest that critical reflection is not only complex (partly  342 
as a consequence of the assumptions associated with it) but also, we would argue, because a 343 
number of historical demographic factors conspire to work against the development of a 344 
critical mindset particularly for those who work within the world of applied sport  345 
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psychology. Given the nature of the above debate it is ironic that many of these ‘factors’ 346 
relate in one way or another to power. For example, the discipline’s dominant positivistic or 347 
experimental methodology, though productive and thorough in research terms, does, 348 
nevertheless, encourage undergraduate and postgraduate sport psychologists to become 349 
familiar with a writing style that is author evacuated and devoid of personal nuance. In 350 
addition, this way of thinking and writing actively discourages students to consider personal 351 
feelings and opinions as they are, by definition, emotive, unscientific and (some would say) 352 
of little value.  353 
The sense of irony is heightened further as others would doubtless argue that the 354 
emergence of qualitative research would surely act to counterbalance the above restrictions 355 
on authorial voice but the suggestion here is that this is not really the case, well not in the 356 
realm of sport psychology at any rate. A number of commentators (e.g., Biddle, Markland, 357 
Gilbourne, Chatzisanrantis, & Sparkes, 2001; Gilbourne & Richardson, 2006; Knowles et al., 358 
2007) have identified that qualitative research in sport and exercise psychology leans heavily 359 
towards a post-positivist doctrine in which prior theory, often established via quantitative 360 
means, drives and shapes the nature of any qualitative inquiry. Qualitative texts therefore 361 
tend to be theory-led and reinforce an author evacuated style of presentation (Brown, 362 
Gilbourne, & Claydon, 2009). Sparkes (2002) refers to such texts as “realist tales”.  363 
This tendency to foreground established theory is counter to elements of critical 364 
reflective practice which promotes an engagement with self both in-context and self amidst 365 
the complexities of culture and society. Consequently, we would argue, that the distal nature 366 
of the authorial voice, in both quantitative and qualitative texts offers little literary 367 
encouragement or indeed illustration for the reflective practitioners of the future. Against the 368 
backdrop of these underlying methodological challenges it is not so surprising that most 369 
contemporary reflective practice texts in sport psychology provide examples of technical and 370 
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practical reflection (e.g., Clarke, 2004; McCann, 2000). Examples of reflection derived from 371 
critical interests are more difficult to find, at least within texts that are housed within the 372 
sport-based reflective practice literature.  373 
A brief critical interlude 374 
Before considering the possibility that auto-ethnographic texts might act as a 375 
platform, guide or point of illustration for critical reflection, it is helpful to give space to 376 
those who might be less convinced by this particular view. As an example, Bleakley (2000), 377 
contests a number of suppositions that might be utilized to promote the benefits of reflective 378 
writing. In his critical essay ‘Writing with Invisible Ink’ he challenges the earlier views 379 
expressed by Bolton (1999) who associated reflectively derived creative writing with 380 
dynamic learning, self-assertion, self and professional development  and positive therapeutic 381 
effects. Bleakley (2000) was particularly scathing of those who supported a form of reflective 382 
writing that veered towards the confessional. Rather than support the notion, as suggested by 383 
Holly (1989), that (reflective-confessional writing) allows us to come to know ourselves, he 384 
wondered whether such writing might just imprison the writer into a form of subjection in 385 
which reflective texts meander in and around a particular (accepted) set of parameters. 386 
Bleakley (2000) indicated that such writing might become morose and narcissistic rather than 387 
enlightening and attacked (what he termed) the postmodern world for producing amongst 388 
other things: 389 
educators hooked on reflective practices that secure confessional narratives from their  390 
trainees as an initiatory rite embodies as institutional portfolios of evidence of  391 
learning…Where the wealthy have ‘personal trainers’ for their narcissistic fitness  392 
needs, mass education (or in our case applied training) has the training of the personal  393 
as an explicit goal. (parentheses added p. 18) 394 
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It is fair to say Bleakley (2000) was not terribly impressed with the drift towards 395 
confessional writing and though he maintained a degree of hope for the reflective writing 396 
project he was inclined to suggest that such stories might under-achieve, be subsumed under 397 
a culture of narcissism and so diminish in expectation over time.    398 
These are harsh criticisms yet given the heady assumptions associated earlier with 399 
critical social science and critical reflection it is not difficult to see how these assumptions 400 
might first, establish parameters that ‘confine’ writing and secondly how critical aspirations 401 
might be neat enough in academic terms but maybe problematical in terms of experience and 402 
the writing of it. Self indulgence is, of course, something that resides in the eyes of the 403 
beholder. Some readers might find a segment of text or a whole manuscript indulgent, others 404 
might find the same passage of writing and/or manuscript more fascinating and insightful. 405 
This dilemma aside, writers of reflective texts are best guided by published works of a similar 406 
vein, for these will have been peer reviewed and so, to some the least, will not have fallen 407 
victim to the cries of indulgence. On a more personal and straightforward note, writers need 408 
to be vigilant and guard against text that might house a sense of self promotion or self 409 
congratulation. Asking those one trusts to read and feedback in an open and critical manner is 410 
another tried and tested technique. These cautious sentiments are worthy of attention and 411 
form part of the wider debate on the future of reflective practice and particularly the 412 
boundaries and practices that might define it.  413 
 414 
Considering the auto-ethnographic text as a point of illustration for critical reflection/writing 415 
Not withstanding the above critique, having considered various definitions of critical 416 
reflection and also highlighted associated literature sources, we now consider the more 417 
immediate challenges of writing-reflectively from a more up-beat perspective. Rutter (2006), 418 
when discussing reflective writing from the domain of social work, asserts that reflective 419 
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practitioners may have a range of complex cognitive and affective issues to convey but 420 
struggle to express these in written form. One conclusion to emerge from her thinking relates 421 
to a need for others to show reflective practitioners what reflective writing might look like. 422 
This issue of illustration is a challenge and in an attempt to move towards some kind 423 
of solution we have considered how auto-ethnographic texts might assist those who are 424 
engaged in reflective processes from whatever station (administrative, mentor/supervisor or 425 
practitioner). Risner (2002) in his consideration of reflective practice as writing suggests that 426 
an ‘auto’ approach to writing reflectively offers the potential for participants: 427 
To understand self and others, to recognize our own place within oppressive 428 
structures we seek to eliminate and to inform our potential for individual and 429 
collective action for making a better world. (p. 8) 430 
Risner (2002) also argues that the process of reflective writing and the ‘storying’ of 431 
reflective experiences can be undertaken around three steps: 432 
1. retrieving the story in words, illustration and movement, looking again at one’s life 433 
journey, re-searching biographical particulars 434 
2. zooming-in (Watson, 1998) for particularly looking underneath and between the lines 435 
of narrative, reading one’s words, shapes, qualities, preferences, energy and imagery 436 
3. zooming-out (Watson, 1998) or reading the larger concerns revealed from the 437 
uniqueness of the personal narrative. Zooming-out for the reflective practitioner allows each 438 
narrative reflection to speak again, not merely on a purely personal level, but more broadly in 439 
dialogue with critical theories for emancipatory change. 440 
 We suggest that these suggestions are helpful not least as they partly return the focus 441 
to earlier philosophical assumptions associated with critical reflection. The above ideas for 442 
structuring the reflective writing process may also resonate with those authors who have 443 
engaged with auto-ethnographic writing, a highly personalized account which by definition is 444 
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contextually located around the authors own life with a focus on significant, often 445 
challenging issues. Auto-ethnographic texts are often infused with emotive content, promote 446 
the notion that someone’s own story has implications for others and also might offer insights 447 
that include a sense of journey, of change and might also embrace a societal dimension.  448 
In a stylistic sense auto-ethnographic texts also offer a clear point of illustration to 449 
those who seek to write in the first person. As noted earlier “I” is not a term that sport and 450 
exercise scientists are encouraged to use, indeed most research methods programs will 451 
discourage any tendency to personalize a text be it an essay or research account. The author 452 
evacuated, theory-laden approach to writing is the common nomenclature of science 453 
generally and of the sport and exercise sciences more specifically. Yet a reflective text is 454 
bound in the experiences of the individual and as such must reach out towards a different 455 
authorial voice, one that embraces self and emphasizes self alongside others. Such 456 
assumptions encourage reflective practitioners to move across the keyboard to type “I” and 457 
for many that is likely to feel quite strange. 458 
It is of course possible to argue that spending time on the issue of writing in the first 459 
person (in the “I”) is a wasted exercise as technical and practical reflective texts already offer 460 
examples of that way of writing of that ‘style’ and they do. The use of “I” in a critical 461 
reflective account moves beyond “I did this”, “I felt uncomfortable”, “I felt sad”. These 462 
statements are fine (of course) but they do tend to lack any sense of evocative, emotional 463 
and/or disconcerting connection between self, experience and society more generally. Auto-464 
ethnography and the use of “I” in such texts reflect observations that embrace wider 465 
dynamics. For example, an auto-ethnographic text might explore self as a part of a system 466 
(such as accreditation training), without any direct connection to critical social science and 467 
auto-ethnographic text may begin to challenge the way a system works, query a systems 468 
power, ponder a systems sense of truth and certainty. Getting to grips with the sense of 469 
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writing reflective practice texts in the first person is important as the reflective process is 470 
primarily an internal dialogue. So writing in the ‘I’ brings a greater sense of ownership and 471 
even authenticity to the text, it brings permission to experience and to write as experienced 472 
rather than experience and write about the experience from a  distance. Consider this short 473 
(auto-ethnographic-reflective) segment offered by Gilbourne (in Gilbourne & Richardson, 474 
2006): 475 
Less expectation then for the psychologist to ‘turn things around’, less hype, fewer 476 
fireworks just indispensable support. In the world I have portrayed I am mindful that 477 
the support-performance axis remains elusive. Furthermore, I see that the intuitive 478 
(appealing) logic that links covert caring support to performance is largely beyond the 479 
measurement of science. To be candid I am untroubled by that. More generally (and 480 
in my most weary of moments) I wonder whether overplaying the performance 481 
accountability agenda risks leading the profession into troubled waters….when 482 
psychologists in a laudable desire to begin working with athletes, overstate the 483 
association between PST and performance, then (to my mind) they forge the very 484 
sword upon which their applied work might fall. (p. 335) 485 
This brief extract queries the dominance of science, challenges the wisdom of a truism 486 
that accompanies science-based practice (namely that applied sport psychology practice leads 487 
to improved performance in athletes) and suggests a new way forward one based on caring 488 
and the intuitive skills that accompany such an aspiration. These conclusions were arrived at 489 
via a long term engagement with reflective practice undertaken as part of an embedded 490 
methodology (ethnography in this case) and the stylistic pitch was influenced by the intra-491 
personal tones of auto-ethnography.  492 
As another example, Stone (2009), a UK based Professor of language and linguistics, 493 
uses auto-ethnography writing as a research tool through which he explores his own past 494 
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experience and present consequences of anorexia, excessive exercising and psychosis linking 495 
starvation of the body to the repression of traumatic memory. The style of writing is 496 
purposely hesitant and uncertain reflecting the way people might typically think about feel 497 
about and construct events particularly when the constructions are seen through the lens of 498 
mental illness and memory suppression. The following vignette is offered as an illustration of 499 
a text which captures not only his own behavior that of his mother: 500 
His memory, so cloudy now, was of cars arriving, of doctors, of his mother. Of a bed,  501 
of sedation. And, the next day, of the drive to the hospital. On the way they stopped  502 
and he bought chocolate. This was significant; even then he realised it. It was a kind 503 
 of giving in. Finally, he had surrendered to his need. He remembered, or thought he  504 
remembered, his mother’s pleasure at this purchase. So perhaps she had noticed his  505 
physical deterioration after all. (p. 69) 506 
Brendon’s mother appears seemingly pleased at his purchase of chocolate is a major point of 507 
departure from one view (she doesn’t even know I’m ill) to another (she may have known 508 
this all along). This is a profound shift and one that had come to the fore through reflection 509 
and contemplation on that one incident. Auto-ethnographic influences, therefore, are not just 510 
a matter of style or pitch, auto-ethnography also crosses hitherto secure academic lines in 511 
which activity or experience is not simply described (as a technical or practical reflective text 512 
might describe) but is used as a pivotal moment for suggesting change. To produce such texts 513 
writers need to submerge into their own experiences to juxtaposition social, economic or 514 
political constraints and position self through raised awareness and possibly liberation 515 
(Gilbourne, 1999). Readers are subsequently encouraged to walk in the shoes of the author to 516 
see what he saw, to appreciate his dilemmas, and feel something of what he felt. Reflective 517 
writing that attempts to achieve such high levels of engagement usually carries with it the 518 
aspiration that readers will be moved to reflect further on their own lives (Gilbourne, 2002). 519 
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As the act of reflecting on-self is thought to encourage further reflection in-others then the 520 
processes of writing and (eventually) reading aspires to move ideas and accounts from the 521 
intra to the inter-personal and so seeks to gather a sense of momentum and influence. More 522 
generally, and as noted in the citations from Gilbourne and Richardson (2006) and Stone 523 
(2009), the angst and sense of ‘journey’ in most auto-ethnographic texts introduces 524 
practitioners to the notion through their own reflective practices, they might develop different 525 
points of view, challenge the status quo, query established truths, and be comfortable to lay 526 
bare experiences that might evoke sentiments such as uncertainty and unease. In other words 527 
such texts might offer a source of and so illustrate critical engagement in terms of reflection 528 
and writing. 529 
The quandary of embracing critical reflective practice based upon critical social science. 530 
As this paper has been submitted to the professional practice section of TSP it is clear 531 
that many readers might, at some point, expect some kind of applied comment. Indeed, 532 
reviewers of the present manuscript have themselves requested a section that provided 533 
guidelines for how “to do” critical reflection. In response, it is important to for us to reiterate 534 
that we compiled this paper to encourage professional practice debate for this, seemed to us, 535 
to be a valuable exercise in and of itself. However, and as we have been requested to revise 536 
with some comment on the doing of critical reflective practice we offer a number of 537 
observations. First, it might be better to maybe recalibrate the question. Rather than asking 538 
how one might do critical reflective practice? It might be more productive to consider what 539 
are the necessary conditions that might encourage critical reflection more generally? The 540 
messages contained in the present manuscript have suggested that engaging with the nuances 541 
of critical social science are essential to critical reflection, the two, we suggest, go hand-in-542 
hand. Consequently, doing critical reflection would appear to be dependent on a series of 543 
permissions being granted and this notion impacts across a range of hierarchical levels within 544 
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applied sport psychology. If we accept that governing bodies and accrediting agencies/panels 545 
and so forth operate at a strategic level and so influence activity at a more operational level, 546 
then an interest in critical social science, and the literature associated with it, might be 547 
accompanied by a desire or aspiration to see critical reflection demonstrated in the latter 548 
stages of reflective practice applied training. In the case just sketched out here, permission, 549 
for change that might embrace critical reflection might begin with initiatives promoted by 550 
strategic governance in whatever form that might take. In turn, aspirations from the apex of 551 
hierarchy may, over time, permeate curricular content and adjust reading lists accordingly. In 552 
the present text we suggest that narrative inquiry and more specifically the genre of auto-553 
ethnography might be one way for pedagogy to introduce, illustrate and embrace elements of 554 
critical social science. So, doing critical social science, at least in the form explained here, is 555 
aligned to notions of permission and so, we suggest, is embedded to power. To explain, a 556 
student who has worked hard to gain a good undergraduate and postgraduate qualification 557 
(and possibly incurred debts in the process) and has the opportunity to be mentored in their 558 
applied work by an established professor in the field, is unlikely to start ruminating, 559 
contesting and challenging in the style that might be expected of a critical social scientist, 560 
even if they have doubts over what they see and how they feel; why should they rock the 561 
boat?  If, on the other hand, when they begin working with their experienced mentor, if they 562 
are given permission to think the unthinkable to challenge the most accepted elements of 563 
practice and to constantly monitor their own sense of well-being as they consider issues of 564 
justice and emancipation, then, they might, like their mentor, become critical social scientists. 565 
However, this activity would be unfair in the extreme if any given mentor (critical or 566 
otherwise) stood alone with their ideas and had little in the way of support from peers. In 567 
such circumstances they would, in effect, be exposing their student to undue risk. So, when 568 
reviewers ask us to ‘tell us how to do critical reflection’ we would suggest with all due 569 
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respect, and at this moment in time, it is better to think about how the applied sport 570 
psychology profession might permit this way of thinking and so encourage a critical social 571 
science agenda to flourish and grow. In asking ourselves this question we returned constantly 572 
to the issue of gatekeepers and power a process that led us to wonder who owns the keys to 573 
such permission? 574 
Conclusion. 575 
If those who administer the domain of applied sport psychology wish reflective 576 
practice as a process, reflective writing as a product and evaluation as an associated 577 
procedure to be associated with critical levels of engagement, then a number of challenges 578 
will need to be met. These include a readiness to engage with a diverse and unfamiliar 579 
literature base and, through the auspices of critical social science, display a willingness to 580 
allow the foundations of contemporary practice to be regularly contested and challenged. 581 
Consequently a critical journey needs to be shared by administrative/strategic thinkers as well 582 
as mentors and practitioners. A practitioner “going it alone” may find the journey 583 
uncomfortable. Historical/traditional and/or methodological barriers to a ready appreciation 584 
of critical levels of reflection have also been suggested and the auto-ethnographic literature 585 
(though challenging and unusual for many) has been signposted here as a potential source of 586 
illustration in terms of content and style. Finally, we began the present paper by calling for a 587 
new phase of debate on the future direction of reflective practice and hope that issues raised 588 
here will help to begin that process. 589 
          590 
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